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Abstract Scientific communities have adopted different conventions for or-
dering authors on publications. Are these choices inconsequential, or do they
have significant influence on individual authors, the quality of the projects
completed, and research communities at large? What are the trade-offs of us-
ing one convention over another? In order to investigate these questions, we
formulate a basic two-player game theoretic model, which already illustrates
interesting phenomena that can occur in more realistic settings.
We find that alphabetical ordering can improve research quality, while
contribution-based ordering leads to a denser collaboration network and a
greater number of publications. Contrary to the assumption that free riding is
a weakness of the alphabetical ordering scheme, this phenomenon can occur
under any contribution scheme, and the worst case occurs under contribution-
based ordering. Finally, we show how authors working on multiple projects can
cooperate to attain optimal research quality and eliminate free riding given
either contribution scheme.
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1 Introduction
Resource allocation is a central problem in artificial intelligence and more gen-
erally, economic activity is fundamentally about resource allocation. Without
loss of generality, every decision – and thus every computation – can be viewed
as a resource allocation instance (Wellman [24]). Research has been recognized
as an economic activity crucial for the long term well-being of society, and as a
result, developed countries allocate a significant percentage of their resources
to basic and applied research activities. The credit allocation schemes should
incentivize scientific communities to operate at their best; however, decisions
regarding the distribution of research resources are sometimes made in an ad-
hoc manner, with little theoretical or empirical justification of their long-term
performance. In this paper, we investigate one of the core problems in this
domain, namely, the allocation of credit for scientific work.
The allocation of scientific credit influences funding decisions, as well as
tenure, promotions, and awards. Given the critical role that credit allocation
plays in academia, it is surprising how little is known of the effects of name-
ordering conventions. What influence do ordering schemes have on individual
authors? Do they have any global effect on the research communities where
they are applied and the kinds of projects completed therein? What can au-
thors do to overcome the limitations imposed by credit allocation schemes?
Our goal in this paper is to provide a framework for studying the effects
of author ordering schemes and address these questions. While many ordering
conventions are possible, the prominent ones in academic communities are to
list authors by contribution, that is, in descending order of their contribution
to the paper, or alphabetically, in lexicographical order of their last names.
Studying the impact of these conventions will allow research communities to
make informed decisions on whether to apply contribution or alphabetical
author ordering schemes.
Lake [17] shows that listing authors alphabetically gives rise to theMatthew
Effect, whereby readers are likely to assume that the more established authors
deserve more credit. Furthermore, alphabetical ordering can give an unfair
benefit to those whose last names start with letters that occur earlier in the
alphabet [9,10,22]. Tenure at highly ranked schools, fellowship, and to some
extent even Nobel Prize winnings are correlated with surname initials [10].
Indeed, the American Psychological Association [1] mandates ordering authors
by their contribution:
“name of the principal contributor should appear first, with subsequent
names in order of decreasing contribution.”
However, major disciplines such as mathematics, theoretical computer sci-
ence, theoretical physics, and theoretical areas of economics have a long tra-
dition of relying on alphabetical ordering. An empirical pattern about the
attitude of researchers working in these areas is that authors start collabora-
tions trusting others will do their best. Even if the contribution does not turn
out proportional in the end, the authors are given equal credit, which is sig-
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naled through lexicographic ordering. The American Mathematical Society [2]
states:
“Determining which person contributed which ideas is often meaningless
because the ideas grow from complex discussions among all partners...
mathematicians traditionally list authors on joint papers in alphabetical
order.”
More strikingly, there exist studies indicating that alphabetical ordering
can result in improved research quality. Laband and Tollison [16] found that
alphabetical ordering is positively correlated with research quality in eco-
nomics research, where alphabetized papers are more highly cited than non-
alphabetized papers. For example, the data from the American Economic
Review—one of the big five journals in economics—shows that in the five
years after publication, alphabetized articles are cited 50.16 times, while non-
alphabetized articles are cited 30.38 times. From the means of the data in
[16], this implies that alphabetized articles are cited 65% more often than
non-alphabetized articles. Brown, Chan, and Lai [5] observe a similar trend in
the marketing literature.
Joseph, Laband, and Patil [14] provide an extensive discussion of several
studies on academic authorship, as well as synthetic data, by setting up a
stochastic model of author ordering. [14] finds that the tendency towards al-
phabetical author ordering increases as acceptance rates decrease, and that for
a fixed acceptance rate, papers whose authors are listed alphabetically tend
to be of higher quality.
While no scheme is optimal, it is important to first understand the strengths
and weaknesses of each, such that each research community can implement
the one most useful for its types of collaborations. Our investigation addresses
projects completed by one or two parties. This is consistent with the rest of
the literature on collaboration models and network formation games (where
an edge exists between two researchers if they worked on a project together).
One or two-authored papers represent a substantial fraction of the literature
in some fields, including mathematics, physics, and economics. Laband and
Tollison [16] show that, based on the number of citations, two authors appear
to represent the optimal team size in economics. Newman [19] finds that:
“[...] purely theoretical papers appear to be typically the work of two scien-
tists, with high-energy theory and computer science showing averages of 1.99
and 2.22.”
We collected data from the proceedings of major artificial intelligence con-
ferences over the years 2013–2015 and found that approximately 30% of the
published papers are completed by one or two researchers (see Table 1). These
numbers reinforce the study of one and two-authored papers as an important
first step towards understanding the impact of credit allocation schemes.
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1.1 Our Contributions
The main take-away message of our paper is the existence of counterintu-
itive effects due to author ordering schemes; crucially, quality is related to the
effort the scheme can elicit from the participants. We make this point con-
crete by formulating a game theoretic model of collaboration, which allows
the investigation of credit allocation schemes and illustrates several important
phenomena.
Our formulation offers a compelling explanation for the phenomenon that
alphabetical ordering can lead to improved research quality in some commu-
nities. In particular, alphabetical ordering encourages collaborators to match
each other’s efforts: when one of the authors invests a lot of effort into a
project, it is a best response for the co-author(s) to also invest high effort,
since matching efforts leads to higher utility.
On the other hand, we find that contribution-based ordering can result
in the completion of more research projects and a denser social network. The
latter phenomenon has been observed through empirical data analysis by New-
man [20].
When it comes to free riding, at first sight, the issue appears particularly
problematic for alphabetical ordering. However, upon further examination, it
becomes apparent that both schemes are subject to some degree of free riding
and we show the worst case occurs under non-alphabetical ordering.
As with every theoretical study of social behavior, there is a question of
what properties observed in theory apply in practice. We argue that our model
offers a simple and intuitive explanation for several important phenomena
observed empirically; moreover, it makes predictions that can be verified ex-
perimentally. The study of extended models, with additional properties such
as diminishing returns, larger coalitions, divisible budgets, different distribu-
tions of individual effort, and dynamic aspects of social networks remains an
important subject for future work.
1.2 Related Work
Kleinberg and Oren [15] investigated a related question: Why do some aca-
demic communities over-emphasize the importance of highly technical prob-
lems? The authors use a noncooperative model for the allocation of scientific
credit and their main finding is that research communities may have to over-
reward their key scientific challenges, to ensure that such problems are solved
in a Nash equilibrium.
The academic game is a non-transferable utility game with overlapping
coalitions and is related to several types of coalitional games, such as threshold
task games ([6]) and coalitional skill games (Bachrach and Rosenchein [4]).
There are several co-authorship models in the economics and computer
science literature. de Clippel, Moulin, and Tideman [7] study the division of
a homogeneous divisible good when every agent reports an evaluation of the
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Conference 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
IJCAI 15 5,96 34,86 29,81 17,88 6,42 2,75
IJCAI 13 5,69 29,27 30,31 20,46 10,10 3,36
AAAI 15 7,51 25,26 25,05 22,96 12,52 4,17 1,67 1,04
AAAI 14 3,34 23,62 30,78 23,62 10,97 5,72 1,19 0,71
AAAI 13 5,44 29,20 34,65 14,35 8,41 5,94 1,48 0,49
COLT 15 10 28,57 34,28 22,85 4,28
COLT 14 7,69 34,61 40,38 11,53 5,76
COLT 13 19,14 29,78 31,91 10,63 6,38 2,12
NIPS 15 2,97 28,28 34,49 21,33 8,43 2,97 1,24 0,24
NIPS 14 2,94 28,67 35,04 22,54 6,12 3,18 0,98 0,49
NIPS 13 5,11 28,40 32,95 23,29 8,23 0,85 0,85
ICML 15 1,85 30 33,33 22,22 9,25 1,85 0,37 0,74 0,37
ICML 14 2,58 30,96 35,48 21,61 7,09 1,61 0,32 0,32
ICML 13 6,00 26,50 33,21 23,67 8,48 1,76 0,35
UAI 15 1,01 51,51 26,26 12,12 7,07 1,01
UAI 14 8,33 34,37 30,20 19,79 5,20 2,08
UAI 13 2,73 39,72 27,39 23,28 6,84
AAMAS 15 0,97 28,57 37,01 18,18 10,38 3,57 1,94
AAMAS 14 5,67 26,81 35,96 19,24 8,83 2,83 0,94
AAMAS 13 8,26 29,52 31,49 20,07 7,87 2,75 1,18 0,39
Table 1 Major conferences in artificial intelligence with percentage of papers written by
1, 2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , 9 authors, respectively, during the years 2013–2015. Approximately 30% of the
published papers are completed by at most two authors.
others’ contribution, and establish the existence of a unique impartial and
consensual mechanism for three agents. Jackson and Wolinsky [13] introduce
a co-author model with network externalities, where each agent has a unit of
time and can divide it among different collaborations, and study the structure
of the networks in the equilibrium. Anshelevich and Hoefer [3] study the price
of anarchy for contribution games on networks with concave and convex reward
functions.
2 Model
The academic game studied here is a collaboration model defined as a net-
work formation game. This simple, yet expressive formulation captures the
fundamental aspect of collaboration – namely that multiple individuals can
do more than one – and enables the investigation of network effects due to
name ordering schemes.
Let N “ t1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , nu be a set of agents. Each agent i has a budget of weight
wi, consisting of a set of coins Ci “ tci,1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , ci,niu. Every coin ci,j has a
positive weight wi,j , and
řn
j“1 wi,j “ wi, @i P N . The agents can work alone
or in pairs to solve different projects. A project of weight w can be solved
either by:
– one agent who invests a coin of weight w to the project, or
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– two agents, each of which contributes with one coin, such that the sum of
the two coins is w.
An agent can participate in multiple projects simultaneously by investing a
different coin in each project. The same pair of agents can solve multiple
projects together, and each coin can only be used once.
2.1 Reward Function
We study games with a very general class of rewards, namely convex homoge-
nous functions. Homogeneous valuations are often used in economic theory
and have been widely studied in resource allocation domains (for example, in
the setting of multiple goods, the class of homogeneous valuations contains
well-studied instances such as additive linear and Leontief, to constant elastic-
ity of substitution[18,8]). In our model, convexity translates to the property
that greater effort leads to greater reward; the rate at which the increase is
observed varies depending on the degree of the homogeneous function.
Formally, a function F is homogeneous if there exists a positive degree d
such that Fpt ¨ xq “ td ¨ Fpxq, for every x and t ą 0. Since we study a one-
dimensional setting with convex reward, we have: Fpxq “ xd, where d ą 1.
We assume that for every w P R, there exists a project of that weight that the
agent could (in principle) solve.
Finally, in each academic community there is a general perception of the
significance of being the first or the second author on a paper. Without prior
knowledge about the specific paper or its authors, the relative contribution of
each author on a two-authored paper can be represented by a fixed contribution
vector rφ, 1 ´ φs, where 1
2
ď φ ă 1. That is, the community assumes that the
contribution of the first and the second author are φ and p1´ φq respectively
(these values can be seen as percentages of the total worth of the project).
Throughout the paper, we refer to the case where φ “ 1
2
“ 1´φ as alphabetical
ordering, and to the cases where φ ą 1
2
ą 1´φ as contribution-based ordering.
Parameter φ is fixed and known to the players.
2.2 Coalition Structures
Next, we define coalition structures and utility in academic games.
Definition 1 Given an academic game, a coalition structure is a partition of
the set of all coins, such that every coin ci,j of agent i is either a singleton
project, or is paired with a coin ck,l belonging to another agent k P Nztiu.
Definition 2 Given an academic game and a coalition structure CS, let CSi
be the set of projects that agent i contributes to, @i P N . The utility of i is:
uipCSq “
ÿ
PjPCSi
vipPjq,
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where tP1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Pmu is the set of projects solved under CS, wpPjq is the weight
of project Pj , and
vipPjq “
$&
%
wpPjq
d if i completes Pj alone
φ ¨ wpPjq
d if i is first author on Pj
p1´ φq ¨ wpPjq
d if i is second author on Pj
Next we give an example of an academic game.
Example 1 Consider an academic game with two agents, where d “ 2, agent 1
has the set of coins C1 “ tc1,1, c1,2u, agent 2 has the set C2 “ tc2,1u, and the
weights of the coins are: w1,1 “ 3, w1,2 “ 1, w2,1 “ 2. The possible coalition
structures are: CS1 “ ptc1,1u, tc1,2u, tc2,1uq, CS2 “ ptc1,1, c2,1u, tc1,2uq, and
CS3 “ ptc2,1, c1,2u, tc1,1uq, where for each project, the coins are listed by
decreasing size. The utilities of the agents are as follows:
CS1 : u1pCS1q “ w
d
1,1 ` w
d
1,2 “ 3
2 ` 12 “ 10
u2pCS1q “ w
d
2,1 “ 2
2 “ 4.
CS2: u1pCS2q “ φ ¨ pw1,1 ` w2,1q
d ` wd
1,2 “ φ ¨ 5
2 ` 12 “ 25φ` 1
u2pCS2q “ p1 ´ φq ¨ pw1,1 ` w2,1q
d “ 25p1´ φq
CS3: u1pCS3q “ p1 ´ φq ¨ pw2,1 ` w1,2q
d ` wd
1,1 “ 9p1´ φq ` 9
u2pCS3q “ φ ¨ pw2,1 ` w1,2q
d “ 9φ [\
3 Indivisible Budgets
We first study the setting of indivisible budgets, where each agent owns a single
coin, corresponding to the scenario where every agent is involved in a single
project. This setting is sufficient to differentiate between alphabetical and
contribution ordering and highlights an interesting effect. Namely, there exist
natural settings in which alphabetical ordering encourages agents to match
each others’ efforts, and as a result, it leads to the completion of larger projects.
First, we introduce pairwise stability, the standard solution concept in
network formation games [12]. A coalition structure CS is pairwise stable if:
– For all i P N , uipCSq ě w
d
i . That is, i cannot improve by allocating his
coin to a singleton project.
– For all i, j P N , with wi ě wj , either uipCSq ě φ ¨ pwi `wjq
d or ujpCSq ě
p1 ´ φq ¨ pwi ` wjq
d. That is, i and j cannot deviate by forming a joint
project.
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3.1 Research Quality
We show that alphabetical ordering can result in higher research quality
than is possible under some contribution-based scheme. Since agents can work
either by themselves or in pairs, the most difficult project that a set of agents
can solve results from the combined efforts of two of its strongest agents. We
call a project of this difficulty a hard project, which can only be solved by two
of the strongest agents, and no other combination.
We begin by considering identical agents.
Lemma 1 Consider an academic game with identical agents and indivisible
budgets. Then every pairwise stable coalition structure solves the maximum
number of hard projects whenever the credit to the first author is in the range:
φ P
´
1
2d
, 2
d´1
2d
¯
.
Proof When the agents are identical, a project is hard if solved by two agents.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that each agent has a budget of size
1. In order for the maximum number of hard projects to be solved in every
pairwise stable equilibrium, it should be the case that two singleton agents can
strictly improve their utility by working on a joint project. The conditions for
the first and second author, respectively, are: φ ¨ 2d ą 1d and p1´φq ¨ 2d ą 1d,
or equivalently, φ P
´
1
2d
, 2
d´1
2d
¯
. [\
Note the maximum number of hard projects is always solved under alpha-
betical ordering (φ “ 1
2
).
Next we consider a game with heavy agents and light agents ; the weights
are normalized such that the heavy agents invest coins of weight 1 and the
light agents invest coins of weight λ P p0, 1q. A contribution scheme can en-
courage same-layer collaborations (resulting in the completion of the maximum
number of hard projects), or cross-layer collaborations, or simply discourage
collaboration (by giving very little credit to second authors, for example). The
proof is included in the appendix.
Theorem 1 Consider an academic game with indivisible budgets and two
types of agents, light and heavy. Then every pairwise stable coalition struc-
ture has:
1. Only same-layer collaborations when
p1` λqd
2d ` p1 ` λqd
ă φ ă min
ˆ
1´
1
2d
,
1
p1` λqd
,
2d
2d ` p1` λqd
˙
2. Only cross-layer collaborations when
max
ˆ
1´
1
2d
,
1
p1` λqd
,
2d
2d ` p1` λqd
˙
ă φ ă 1´
ˆ
λ
1` λ
˙d
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3. No collaboration when 1´ 1
2d
ă φ ă 1p1`λqd or φ ą max
ˆ
1´ 1
2d
, 1´
´
λ
1`λ
¯d˙
Observe that by setting φ “ 1
2
, we obtain that alphabetical ordering solves
the highest number of hard projects, while ordering by contribution in the
range given by Case 2 solves the highest number of intermediate projects
(requiring one heavy and one light coin).
3.2 Free Riding
It has been argued that alphabetical ordering is unfair [17], as it gives the same
credit to all authors even when they do not contribute equally. However, the
fundamental difficulty leading to free riding is that the contribution scheme is
fixed, not whether it is alphabetical or contribution-based.
Even when authors are ordering by contribution, members of academic
communities have predetermined notions of the proportion of work contributed
by each author1. Authors cannot choose the contribution vector, as doing so
would require changing the perception of the entire community.
We show that the use of a fixed contribution vector necessarily leads to the
free riding effect. In addition, the degree of free riding admitted by alphabetical
ordering is not the worst possible.
Formally, if two agents allocate weights x and y, respectively, to a joint
project, then the rewards should be proportional to the effort invested, i.e.´
x
x`y
¯
px` yqd and
´
y
x`y
¯
px ` yqd, respectively.
Thus, the fair contribution vector for this project is uniquely defined as:
C “
”
x
x`y ,
y
x`y
ı
. All other contribution vectors result in free riding.
For each agent, the free riding index is the (normalized) difference between
the perceived contribution and the actual contribution. Recall that wpP q de-
notes the weight of project P . Given a contribution scheme φ, the free riding
index of agent i in a coalition structure CS where he solves project P is:
Li “
$’&
’%
0 if i completes P alone
φ¨wpP q´wi
wpP q if i is the first author on P
p1´φqwpP q´wi
wpP q if i is the second author on P
We begin by considering identical agents. Since they contribute equally to
a project, alphabetical author ordering corresponds to the unique fair contri-
bution vector for their project. In particular, larger values of φ result in more
free riding for first authors.
Theorem 2 Consider an academic game with identical agents and indivisible
budgets. Then alphabetical ordering is the unique fair contribution vector, while
1 For instance, while in some communities the second author is assumed to have done
moderately less than the first, in others, the contribution of the second author is considered
to be negligible compared with that of the first.
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when the credit to the first author, φ, is greater than 2
d´1
2d
, then every pairwise
stable coalition structure has a free riding index of φ´ 1{2 for at least n{2´ 1
of the agents.
Proof It is immediate that first authors always benefit from this collaboration.
The second authors would only participate as long as p1 ´ φq ¨ 2d ą 1d, or
equivalently, φ ă 1´ 1
2d
. The free riding index of all first authors is φ´ 1
2
. [\
The free riding index is highest when the contribution vector is steep; the
credit to the first author can be as high as φ “ 2
d´1
2d
without preventing the
second author from collaborating. In this case, the free riding index of all first
authors is 1
2
´ 1
2d
. For example, when d “ 2, the maximum free riding index is
25%. In general, the higher the reward of collaboration, the more free riding
can occur.
Corollary 1 There exist academic games and contribution-based ordering schemes
such that in every pairwise stable coalition structure, the free riding index is
1
2
´ 1
2d
for half of the agents.
Next, we find the largest free riding index that can occur under alphabetical
ordering; the argument follows by the definition of the model.
Lemma 2 Consider an academic game with heavy and light agents, of weights
1 and λ respectively. Then in every coalition structure that is pairwise stable
under alphabetical ordering, all the light agents that collaborate with heavy
agents have a free riding index of 1
2
p1 ´ λq. The worst case is obtained when
λ “ 1
2
1
d
´ 1
2
.
It follows that the largest possible free riding index under alphabetical
ordering is no greater than 2´
1
d ´ 1
2
. For example, when d “ 2, the free riding
index is « 20%.
While in the previous results we showed that the contribution vector can
affect as many as half of the agents involved, the same worst case bounds hold
for individual agents in arbitrary games.
Theorem 3 Consider an academic game in which the agents have indivisible
budgets of arbitrary sizes. Then the highest free riding index of any agent occurs
under contribution-based ordering. Moreover, the highest amount of free-riding
that occurs in any project solved under alphabetical ordering is smaller than
under contribution-based ordering.
Proof Note that the bound in Lemma 2 represents the highest free riding index
that any agent can incur under alphabetical ordering, namely 1
2
1
d ´ 1
2
. The
result follows from Lemma 2 and Corollary 1, which imply that the amount of
free riding can be as high as 1
2
´ 1
2d
under some contribution-based ordering
schemes.
To show that the highest amount of free-riding in any project solved under
alphabetical ordering is smaller than under contribution-based ordering, we
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need to show that 1
2
1
d ´ 1
2
ď 1
2
´ 1
2d
, or equivalently, 1
2
d
` 1
2
1
d ď 1. The
inequality can be shown by analyzing the behavior of the following function:
f : r1,8q Ñ R, where fpxq “ 1
2
x
` 1
2
1
x . Note that fp1q “ 1 and limxÑ8 fpxq “
1. The first derivative of f is
f 1pxq “
ln p2q
x2¨2
1
x
´
ln p2q
2x
.
The function f 1pxq “ 0 has a unique solution2 at the point x0 ą 1 with the
property that 2x0 “ x2
0
¨ 2
1
x0 , and moreover f 1pxq ă 0 for all x P p1, x0q and
f 1pxq ą 0 for all x ą x0. Then fpxq ă 1 for all x ą 1 as required. [\
To conclude, even though at first sight, alphabetical ordering appears to
be particularly susceptible to free-riding, further investigation reveals that no
contribution scheme is immune to free riding; neither listing authors alphabet-
ically nor listing them in decreasing order of contribution can eliminate this
effect. Moreover, the worse case attained using alphabetical ordering is better
than that of some contribution based schemes.
3.3 Stability
In this section we show that alphabetical author ordering guarantees the ex-
istence of a pairwise stable coalition structure; furthermore, it can always be
found in polynomial time, while non-alphabetical ordering may not have any
stable coalition structure.
In the following theorems, a tie-breaking rule is defined as usual (i.e. lexi-
cographic), and will mean the function that decides which of two authors with
equal contributions comes first.
Theorem 4 Every academic game with identical agents and indivisible bud-
gets has a pairwise stable coalition structure.
Proof Without loss of generality, assume that the deterministic tie-breaking
rule lists the agents in the order r1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , ns. If φ ě 1 ´ 1
2d
, then the singleton
coalition structure, CS “ pt1u, ¨ ¨ ¨ , tnuq is pairwise stable, since no agent can
improve their utility by being second author on a project. If φ ă 1´ 1
2d
, there
are two cases. If n is even, then CS
1
“ pt1, 2u, ¨ ¨ ¨ , tn ´ 1, nuq is pairwise
stable. If n is odd, then CS
2
“ pt2, 3u, ¨ ¨ ¨ , tn´ 1, nu, t1uq, is pairwise stable,
since no agent has an incentive to switch to a singleton, the coalition structure
given by CS
2
zt1u is pairwise stable (by case 1), and agent 1 cannot be part
of a deviating pair, since no other agent has an incentive to join 1 as a second
author. [\
Theorem 5 Consider an academic game with different agents and indivisible
budgets. Under alphabetical ordering, a pairwise stable coalition structure is
guaranteed to exist and can be computed in polynomial time.
2 This can be easily checked; see, e.g., http://www.wolframalpha.com
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Proof Let N “ t1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , nu be the set of agents and without loss of generality,
let w1 ě w2 ě ¨ ¨ ¨ ě wn. Start with an empty coalition structure: CS “ H.
Iteratively, pair whenever possible the two agents with the heaviest weights
among the remaining agents. Let tk, k ` 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , nu be the remaining set of
agents during some iteration. If
1
2
¨ pwk ` wk`1q
d ě wdk
and
1
2
¨ pwk ` wk`1q
d ě wdk`1
then let CS Ð CSYtk, k`1u, otherwise, CS Ð CSYtku. We claim that the
resulting coalition structure, CS, is pairwise stable. If CS contains coalition
t1, 2u, then agent 1 does not have an incentive to form another pair or move
to a singleton, since agent 1’s utility in CS, u1pCSq, verifies the following
inequalities:
u1pCSq ě w
d
1
and
u1pCSq ě
1
2
¨ pw1 ` wjq
d,@j P Nzt1u
Similarly, agent 1 does not deviate if it is in a singleton coalition structure.
Iteratively, whenever the first k agents do not have an incentive to deviate,
agent k ` 1 does not have an incentive to deviate either. Thus CS is pairwise
stable. [\
On the other hand, contribution-based ordering does not guarantee the
existence of stable coalition structures even under fixed tie-breaking rules.
Theorem 6 There exist academic games with different agents and indivisible
budgets, such that when contribution-based ordering is used, no pairwise stable
coalition structure exists.
Proof Consider a three agent game, with weights 1, 1` ε, and 1` 2ε, respec-
tively, where α “ 1, d “ 2, ε “ 0.8, and φ “ 0.8. It can be easily verified that no
coalition structure is stable. The singleton coalition structure is blocked by the
agents with weights t1, 1`εu, the coalition structure CS “ pt1`ε, 1u, t1`2εuq
is blocked by t1 ` 2ε, 1u, CS
1
“ pt1` 2ε, 1` εu, t1uq is blocked by t1 ` ε, 1u,
and CS
2
“ pt1` 2ε, 1u, t1` εuq is blocked by t1` 2ε, 1` εu. [\
Next we show that pairwise stable coalition structures can be found in poly-
nomial time. The proof uses a connection with the stable roommates problem,
which is a generalization of the stable marriage problem and can be roughly
stated as follows.
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Stable Roommates Problem: There are 2n participants and n rooms
(each accommodating two people); each participant wishes to find a
roommate to live with. The participants have a ranking for the others
in strict order of preference. A matching is a set of n pairs of partici-
pants, such that the agents in each pair will share a room together. The
goal is to find stable matching, i.e. where it will not be the case that for
two participants i and j, they each prefer each other to their current
roommates.
The stable roommates problem was studied in a very influential paper by Irv-
ing [11]; a polynomial time algorithm for preferences with ties (where partici-
pants may have equal value for some roommates) and incomplete lists (where
a participant prefers living alone to living with some of the potential room-
mates) is presented for instance in the Ph.d. thesis of Scott [23].
We now rely on the roommates problem to prove the following result:
Theorem 7 Consider an academic game with different agents and indivisible
budgets. Then a pairwise stable coalition structure can be found in polynomial
time when it exists.
Proof The game is an instance of the stable roommates problem with ties
and incomplete lists, where an agent i finds another agent j unacceptable if
i prefers working alone instead of forming a pair with j. In our setting, each
agent can be mapped to a “roommate” and the preferences are induced by
how valuable the coin of each agent is. [\
4 Discrete Budgets
We now turn our attention to the general model, where each agent has mul-
tiple coins, allowing agents to work on multiple projects simultaneously. The
model of discrete budgets allows uncovering several phenomena that cannot
be observed in the indivisible budget setting, such as the following: there exist
many games in which the contribution vector does not matter, since the agents
can perform rotations, by alternating between being first and second author
on joint projects. Rotations can allow agents to reach optimal research quality
as well as obtain perfect fairness.
Our solution concept is pairwise stability for games with overlapping coali-
tion structures. Given that an agent can be involved in multiple projects si-
multaneously, it is important that one estimates correctly the reactions from
the rest of the agents before agreeing to participate in a deviation. We fol-
low the recent literature on overlapping coalition formation games ([6], Zick,
Chalkiadakis, and Elkind [25]), and study sensitive reactions to a deviation.
In short, when agent i is involved in a deviation from a coalition structure CS,
i can expect that:
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– Every non-deviating agent who is hurt by the deviation retaliates and drops
all the projects with i. Note that unless i and j agreed to deviate together,
an agent j is hurt by the deviation when at least one of j’s projects has
been discontinued by the deviator(s).
– The unaffected agents are neutral and maintain all of their existing projects
with i.
Definition 3 A coalition structure CS is pairwise stable if:
– No agent i can drop some of his existing projects and strictly improve in
the new coalition structure, CS
1
– No two agents i and j, can rearrange the projects among themselves and
possibly drop some of the projects with the remaining agents, such that
both i and j strictly improve their utility in CS
1
,
where CS
1
is the resulting coalition structure, in which non-deviators have
sensitive reactions to a deviation.
The next example illustrates pairwise stability for discrete budgets.
Example 2 Consider an academic game with three agents, sets of coins: C1 “
tc1,1, c1,2u, C2 “ tc2,1, c2,2u, and C3 “ tc3,1, c3,2u, and the coalition structure
CS “ ptc1,1, c2,1u, tc2,2, c3,1u, tc1,2, c3,2uq.
If agent 1 deviates by allocating the coin c1,2 to a singleton project, then
1 expects that the resulting coalition structure is CS
1
“ ptc1,1, c2,1u, tc1,2u,
tc3,2u, tc2,2, c3,1uq, since agent 2 is not hurt by the deviation.
On the other hand, if the deviating coalition is t1, 2u and the deviation con-
sists of forming the joint project tc1,1, c2,2u, then 1 and 2 expect the resulting
coalition structure is CS
2
“ ptc1,1, c2,2 u, tc2,1u, tc1,2u, tc3,1u, tc3,2uq, since
agent 3 is hurt by the deviation and drops all the projects with the deviators.
[\
4.1 Rotations
Agents can sometimes overcome the limitations of a fixed contribution scheme.
That is, they can simultaneously solve the highest number of hardest projects
and eliminate free riding, regardless of the contribution vector. We refer to
this phenomenon as rotations : agents collaborating on multiple projects agree
that one of them is the first author on half of their projects, while the other
is first on the remaining projects, regardless of whether this represents their
actual contributions.
We first demonstrate this for budgets with multiple identical coins.
Theorem 8 There exist academic games with discrete budgets and multiple
identical coins such that for every φ, the maximum number of hard projects is
solved in a pairwise stable equilibrium and no free riding occurs.
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Proof Let φ ă 1 and consider a two agent game, such that agent 1 has coins
tc1,1, c1,2u, agent 2 has coins tc2,1, c2,2u, and all the coins have weight 1.
Consider the coalition structure CS “ pC1, C2q, where C1 “ tc1,1, c2,1u and
C2 “ tc2,2, c1,2u, such that agent 1 is the first author on project C1 and agent
2 is the first author on project C2.
It can be verified that both agents receive the best possible utility, which
coincides with the fair allocation given by alphabetical ordering. Moreover, CS
is pairwise stable: no agent can gain by investing the coin from their second-
author project to a singleton project, since the other agent will retaliate and
drop the other project as well. [\
Rotations can also be used to eliminate free riding when coins are not re-
quired to be identical, and projects require the combination of different coin
types.
Next we study rotations in games where there exists a conference tier, i.e.
for which there is a threshold t ą 0 such that a project of weight w gives
reward Fpwq if w ě t, and zero otherwise.
Theorem 9 Let 1`λ be the conference tier. Then there are academic games
with discrete budgets, where each agent has an equal number of light and heavy
coins, of weight 1 and λ P p0, 1q, respectively, such that there exist pairwise
stable coalition structures with no free riding.
Proof Let φ ă 1 and consider a two agent game, such that agent 1 has coins
tc1,1, c1,2u, agent 2 has coins tc2,1, c2,2u, and all the coins have weight 1.
Consider the coalition structure CS “ pC1, C2q, where C1 “ tc1,1, c2,1u and
C2 “ tc2,2, c1,2u, such that agent 1 is the first author on project C1 and agent
2 is the first author on project C2. It can be verified that both agents receive
the best possible utility, which coincides with the fair allocation given by al-
phabetical ordering. Moreover, the coalition structure is pairwise stable. None
of the agents can gain by investing the coin from their second-author project
to a singleton project, since the other agent will retaliate and drop the other
project as well. [\
4.2 Implications for the Social Network
For the next result we illustrate the following phenomenon observed in [20]:
when the agents use ordering by contribution, they have more co-authors than
when using alphabetical ordering. We consider the setting in which every agent
has a budget consisting of heavy coins and light coins. The light coins represent
very little effort, such as “cheap talk”, but can contribute to improving the
quality of a paper. Allowing for cheap talk results in a much higher number of
collaborations.
Theorem 10 Consider an academic game with discrete budgets, where each
agent has several heavy and light coins, of sizes 1 and ε, respectively, such that
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0 ă ε ! 1. Moreover, the conference tier is 1 and each agent has more heavy
coins than light coins.
Then whenever φ ą max
´
2
d
2d`p1`εqd
, 1
p1`εqd
¯
, every pairwise stable equi-
librium solves the maximum number of projects and the average number of
collaborators per agent is the highest possible.
Proof To ensure that every pairwise stable coalition structure solves the max-
imum number of collaborations, the best investment of a heavy coin should be
to pair it with a small coin. That is, an agent prefers being the first author on a
project of weight 1`ε instead of either second author on a hard project or the
only author on a singleton project. The conditions are: p1´φq ¨2d ă φ ¨ p1`εqd
and φ ¨ p1` εqd ą 1; equivalently, φ ą max
´
1
p1`εqd
, 2
d
2d`p1`εqd
¯
.
Then in every pairwise stable coalition structure, all the heavy coins are
paired with small coins, and the average number of collaborators is maxi-
mal. Note that while alphabetical ordering solves the highest number of hard
projects, both the number of projects completed and the number of collabora-
tors are twice as low. Finally, the singleton coalition structure solves the same
number of projects above the conference tier. However, in this case, the agents
have no collaborators, and the quality of the projects is lower compared to the
case when cheap talk is allowed. [\
There exist games in which ordering by contribution allows to simultane-
ously maximize the number of hard projects and the total number of projects.
We illustrate this phenomenon when there exist both an upper and lower
bound on the hardness of the rewarded projects.
Corollary 2 Consider an academic game with discrete budgets, where each
agent has several heavy and light coins, of sizes 1 and λ P p0, 1q, respectively,
the conference tier is 1, and the maximum project hardness is 1 ` λ. Each
agent has more heavy coins than small coins.
Then whenever φ ą max
´
2
d
2d`p1`λqd
, 1
p1`λqd
¯
, every pairwise stable equi-
librium solves the maximum number of projects, each of the projects solved is
the hardest possible, and the average number of collaborators per agent is the
highest possible.
5 Discussion
We introduced a basic game theoretic model for studying author ordering
schemes, which already illustrates interesting phenomena that can occur in
richer domains. The model offers a compelling explanation for several real-
world phenomena, showing that alphabetical ordering is positively correlated
with research quality in some scenarios, while contribution based ordering
results in a larger number of projects completed and denser social networks.
Our model makes several predictions on the effects of author ordering
schemes, which prompt further theoretical and empirical study. In particu-
lar, we show that rotations can be used to overcome the limitations of fixed
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ordering schemes and that the worst case of free riding occurs under some
contribution-based schemes. It would be interesting to empirically evaluate
how frequently free riding and rotations appear in practice, as well as their
influence on individuals and their communities.
In this paper, we focus on modeling communities where the contribution
scheme is established. There are other communities, however, where there is
some ambiguity about the contribution schemes (for example, the dominant
scheme may be contribution-based, but some authors may still choose to order
alphabetically). To further investigate this phenomenon, it would be interest-
ing to study the impact of a probabilistic contribution scheme. Another natural
generalization is to increase the number of authors who may collaborate on the
same project. This generalization may lead to additional insight on the differ-
ences between contribution and alphabetical schemes with regards to research
quality, free riding, and density of the collaboration network.
Another important direction for future work is to understand precisely the
conditions under which alphabetical ordering is better suited than contribution-
based ordering, and vice-versa. In those communities where alphabetical or-
dering is indeed the closest to optimal scheme, policy changes may be called for
to alleviate the effect of alphabetical ordering of unfairly favoring the authors
with earlier names in the alphabet. Such changes could include changing the ci-
tation styles for alphabetical papers or possibly using random ordering, with a
note that the contribution is meant to be weighted equally. Moreover, it would
be interesting to study models that capture additional realistic phenomena,
such as reward functions with diminishing returns, arbitrary coalition sizes,
heterogenous skill sets, and dynamics of social networks that may influence
the equilibria reached.
More generally, the following implementation theory question remains open:
Given a scientific community, what is the optimal credit allocation scheme?
This work is a first step in the direction of understanding this question, which
is at the heart of resource allocation in academic research and arguably the
long term development of society.
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6 Appendix
In this section we include the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 (restated): Consider an academic game with indivisible bud-
gets and two types of players, heavy and light (with weights 1 and λ, respec-
tively), where 0 ă λ ă 1. Then every pairwise stable coalition structure has
1. Only same-layer collaborations when
p1` λqd
2d ` p1 ` λqd
ă φ ă min
ˆ
1´
1
2d
,
1
p1` λqd
,
2d
2d ` p1` λqd
˙
2. Only cross-layer collaborations when
max
ˆ
1´
1
2d
,
1
p1` λqd
,
2d
2d ` p1` λqd
˙
ă φ ă 1´
ˆ
λ
1` λ
˙d
3. No collaboration when 1´ 1
2d
ă φ ă 1p1`λqd or φ ą max
ˆ
1´ 1
2d
, 1´
´
λ
1`λ
¯d˙
.
Proof The proof follows from Lemma 3, Lemma 4, and Lemma 5 below; each
Lemma covers one of the cases in the theorem. [\
Lemma 3 Consider an academic game with indivisible budgets and two types
of players, of weights 1 and λ, respectively, where 0 ă λ ă 1. Then every
pairwise stable coalition structure has only same-layer collaborations when
p1`λqd
2d`p1`λqd ă φ ă min
´
1´ 1
2d
, 1p1`λqd ,
2
d
2d`p1`λqd
¯
.
Proof For every pairwise stable coalition structure to solve the maximum num-
ber of same-layer collaborations, it should be the case that whenever a coalition
structure contains:
– 2 identical singleton projects: the two players can improve their utility by
deviating to a pair. That is, p1 ´ φq ¨ 2d ą 1 and p1 ´ φq ¨ p2λqd ą λd, i.e.
φ ă 1´ 1
2d
.
– 2 cross-layer projects: then there exists an improving deviation by two
players from the same layer. It is sufficient to require that the two heavy
players involved in the cross layer projects deviate together: φ ¨ 2d ą φ ¨
p1` λqd and p1 ´ φq ¨ 2d ą φ ¨ p1` λqd. Thus φ ă 2
d
2d`p1`λqd .
– 1 cross-layer project and 1 heavy singleton project: then the two heavy
players deviate to a pair. The two heavy players can deviate to a pair
when φ ¨ 2d ą φ ¨ p1` λqd and p1´ φq2d ą 1, i.e. φ ă 1´ 1
2d
.
– 1 cross-layer project and 1 light singleton project: then the two light players
deviate to a pair. The two light players can deviate to a pair when φ¨p2λqd ą
p1´ φqp1` λqd and p1´ φqp2λqd ą λd. That is, p1`λq
d
p2λqd`p1`λqd
ă φ ă 1´ 1
2d
.
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In addition, we require that no intermediate project is solved, even when
the maximum number of hard projects is completed. That is, a coalition of
weight 1 ` λ is blocked by a deviation to a singleton by one of the play-
ers, i.e. φ ă 1
p1`λqd
or φ ą 1 ´
´
λ
1`λ
¯d
. It follows that p1`λq
d
2d`p1`λqd
ă φ ă
min
´
1´ 1
2d
, 1
p1`λqd
, 2
d
2d`p1`λqd
¯
. [\
Lemma 4 Consider an academic game with indivisible budgets and two types
of players, of weights 1 and λ, respectively, where 0 ă λ ă 1. Then every
pairwise stable coalition structure has the maximum number of cross-layer col-
laborations when max
´
1
p1`λqd , 1´
1
2d
, 2
d
2d`p1`λqd
¯
ă φ ă 1´
´
λ
1`λ
¯d
.
Proof For every pairwise stable coalition structure to solve the maximum num-
ber of cross-layer collaborations, it should be the case that whenever a coalition
structure contains:
– 2 singleton projects of different weights: then the two players can deviate
to a pair. That is, φ ¨ p1 ` λqd ą 1 and p1´ φqp1 ` λqd ą λd, i.e. 1
p1`λqd
ă
φ ă 1´
´
λ
1`λ
¯d
.
– 1 same-layer project by two heavy players and 1 light singleton project:
then the light player deviates with one of the two heavy players. That is,
φ ¨ p1`λqd ą p1´φq ¨ 2d and p1´φqp1`λqd ą λd, and so 1
1`p 1`λ2 q
d ă φ ă
1´
´
λ
1`λ
¯d
.
– 1 same-layer project by two light players and 1 heavy singleton project:
then the heavy player deviates with one of the light players. That is, p1 ´
φq ¨ p1` λqd ą p1´ φqp2λqd and φ ¨ p1 ` λqd ą 1, i.e. φ ą 1
p1`λqd
.
– 2 same-layer projects of different weights: Then one of the heavy players
deviates with one of the light players. That is, φ ¨ p1 ` λqd ą p1 ´ φq ¨ 2d
and p1´ φq ¨ p2λqd ă p1´ φq ¨ p1` λqd, i.e. φ ą 1
1`p 1`λ2 q
d .
In addition, we require that even when the maximum number of cross layer
collaborations occurs, if there exists a same-layer project, it is blocked by a
deviation of the second player, who prefers to work alone. That is, φ ą 1´ 1
2d
,
and so max
´
1
p1`λqd
, 1´ 1
2d
, 2
d
2d`p1`λqd
¯
ă φ ă 1´
´
λ
1`λ
¯d
. [\
Lemma 5 Consider an academic game with indivisible budgets and two types
of players, of weights 1 and λ, respectively, where 0 ă λ ă 1. Then no pairwise
stable coalition structure has collaborations when 1 ´ 1
2d
ă φ ă 1p1`λqd or
φ ą max
ˆ
1´ 1
2d
, 1´
´
λ
1`λ
¯d˙
.
Proof There are two cases. If the coalition structure contains a same-layer
project, then it is blocked by one of the players, who deviates to a singleton.
That is, p1 ´ φq ¨ 2d ă 1. If the coalition structure contains a cross-layer
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project, then again one of the players deviates to a singleton. That is, either
φ ¨ p1` λqd ă 1 or p1´ φq ¨ p1`λqd ă λd. Thus every pairwise stable coalition
structure contains only singleton projects when either 1´ 1
2d
ă φ ă 1p1`λqd or
φ ą max
ˆ
1´ 1
2d
, 1´
´
λ
1`λ
¯d˙
. [\
